It also discusses the increasing pressure to use the enforcement power of the GATT/WTO system to achieve member compliance with social norms in the areas of labor and environment. The chapter concludes by considering some significant challenges that currently face the international trading system and possible directions of the system's evolution in response to these challenges.
Yet the GATT left some critical issues unresolved (Crowley 2003) . Although average tariff rates had been reduced substantially, stubborn peaks for individual products remained. Some major industries, notably agriculture and textiles and apparel, had been excluded from normal GATT guidelines. Even in covered sectors, importing nations were making extensive use of "administered" protection-such as antidumping actions, countervailing measures, and voluntary export restraints-to limit competition from abroad. Moreover, GATT rules pertained mainly to trade in tangible goods, a significant limitation with international trade in services growing at a rapid rate. Other issues closely linked to trade but not covered by GATT rules included national policies toward foreign direct investment and intellectual property. And perhaps most central, the GATT provided no effective way to resolve disputes among the contracting parties.
Concerns about these shortcomings of the GATT provided much of the agenda for the ambitious Uruguay Round (1986 Round ( -1994 , which culminated in establishment of the WTO. Yet despite the fanfare surrounding the WTO"s birth in 1995, doubts regarding the new organization soon began to materialize. These doubts were heightened by lack of progress in the Doha Round begun in 2001, the first round of multilateral negotiations sponsored by the WTO. Some critics have called for a new Bretton Woods conference to reconfigure the three major international economic organizations and reallocate responsibilities among them. The goal would be to increase their overall effectiveness in addressing problems in global governance not anticipated in the 1940s, including huge bilateral trade imbalances and national efforts to limit climate change.
Section 2 of this chapter describes the evolution and structure of the GATT/WTO system. Section 3 deals with the tension between the fundamental GATT/WTO principle of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, i.e., nondiscrimination among trading partners, and the trend toward discriminatory trading arrangements, including the proliferation of regional agreements as well as new versions of special and differential treatment of lowincome countries. Section 4 focuses on participation of developing countries in the system and the effort to use special treatment to promote development objectives.
Section 5 discusses the pressure to use the enforcement power of the GATT/WTO system to achieve member compliance with social norms in the areas of environment and labor.
Section 6 assesses some significant challenges that currently face the international trading system. Section 7 concludes by considering possible directions of the system"s evolution in response to these challenges.
The World Trade Organization
Notwithstanding repeated threats of its imminent collapse over nearly eight years of negotiations, the Uruguay Round made remarkable headway in addressing some of the most important shortcomings that had plagued the GATT 1947. While negotiators continued the traditional GATT-era work of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to manufactured goods trade (average tariff rates were reduced by 40 per cent), they also broke new ground with agreements to bring trade in services, textiles and apparel, and agricultural products into greater conformity with GATT norms. The Round"s significant achievements included negotiation of commitments to reduce agricultural subsidies, to phase out the Multifibre Arrangement (over a ten year period) and thus apply the same rules to trade in textiles and apparel as to trade in other manufactured goods, and to strengthen protection of intellectual property rights (with phase-in periods based on members" level of economic development). Other agreements improved rules and procedures dealing with a variety of non-tariff measures, including subsidies, technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The goal of these agreements was to balance member governments" acknowledged need to address domestic concerns against the potential for abuse of such policies as a disguised form of import protection or discrimination among trading partners.
The Uruguay Round also departed from precedent in a fundamental respect. With minor exceptions, all WTO members agreed to comply with the obligations spelled out in all the agreements, which were included in the "Single Undertaking." This need for consensus among all participants was in contrast to the approach used in the Tokyo Round, in which various "codes" governing use of non-tariff barriers were endorsed by only some members, primarily the most advanced countries. Rules in the Tokyo Round codes then applied only to trade among signatories. However, there has recently been discussion of reverting to a system that does not require all members to move toward WTO goals at the same rate.
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The most significant departure from the system created by GATT 1947 was a revamping of procedures for settling disputes among trading nations. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) introduced a systematic rules-based approach to resolving disputes concerning members" alleged failure to meet their WTO obligations. This system is usually described as self-enforcing, in that the WTO itself has no power to police national trade policies. Rather, an affected member must initiate each dispute.
Under the current system, any dispute that cannot be resolved through direct negotiation among affected countries is referred to a panel of three experts, almost always specialists in international commercial relations, e.g., diplomats and trade lawyers. The panel report is intended to provide a neutral judgment as to whether the member has violated GATT/WTO rules.
6 If the panel affirms that the contested policy is inconsistent with the member"s WTO obligations, the member can appeal the decision, amend its policies, or face authorized retaliation from trading partners that have lost market access as a result of the violation. Authorized retaliation (and often merely the threat of retaliatory action)-in the form of partners" increased barriers designed to reduce the member"s market access
by an amount commensurate with the effect of the contested policy-provides the enforcement mechanism that maintains adherence to WTO rules and thus protects members" export market access. The DSU is an important improvement over the GATT system, in which any country could in effect veto a panel decision that was contrary to its political or economic interests. and to eliminate discriminatory arrangements (most-favored-nation treatment).
The initial success of the GATT in achieving these goals reflected mutual gains to the participating nations, but, given the overwhelming dominance of the United States in the world economy, the key factor was U.S. willingness to abide by GATT principles.
Cuts in the first GATT round (1947) The GATT/WTO position on PTAs recognizes the desirability of increasing trade through voluntary agreements between two or more members. However, there is also the concern that such agreements should facilitate trade among the partner countries without raising barriers to trade with non-partner countries. 12 Article XXIV therefore places some significant restrictions on the common external tariffs applied by members of a customs union as well as the required product coverage, which is supposed to include "substantially all trade." In practice, however, the GATT/WTO system has taken a laissez-faire attitude, with virtually no effort to ensure that agreements are consistent with the guidelines. Moreover, almost all the new PTAs-the notable exception is the European Union-have been free-trade agreements (FTAs) rather than customs unions with common external tariffs. The result has been what Jagdish Bhagwati termed a "spaghetti bowl" of PTAs, with selective product coverage, lengthy phase-in periods, and complex rules of origin (ROOs).
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Beyond an expectation that new PTAs will be notified to the WTO, the rules on preferential trading appear to exercise little if any discipline over such arrangements. In practice, no preferential agreements among GATT or WTO members, whether developed or developing, have ever been challenged by other members. This laissez-faire posture has given rise to increasing concern about the effects of proliferating free trade agreements on progress toward multilateral trade liberalization. This deleterious effect could arise for either of two reasons (Krueger 2007) . First, the limited capacity of many countries to conduct international trade negotiations may be taxed by efforts to form PTAs. Second, WTO members" incentives to engage in multilateral liberalization may be lessened to the extent that the benefits derived from current PTA membership would thereby be eroded. However, these concerns do not seem to be discouraging members 13 More lenient rules on preferential trading between developing countries are contained in the Tokyo Round agreements signed in 1979.
from pursuing new PTAs. 14 Moreover, some theoretical and empirical research suggests that formation of free trade areas may actually stimulate rather than retard multilateral liberalization, i.e., that PTAs can act as building blocks rather than stumbling blocks (McCulloch and Petri 2007; Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas 2008) .
Developing countries in the international trading system
Although the 23 nations participating in the negotiations that produced the original GATT in 1947 included 12 developing countries, in its early days the GATT was disparaged as a "rich man"s club." 15 The GATT initially focused almost entirely on trade in manufactured goods, i.e., goods that were then exported mainly by the developed countries, and GATT rules for poor countries were mostly the same as those for rich countries. However, developing countries were accorded special treatment through exemptions from some rules, e.g., permission under Article XVIII to use tariffs and quotas to promote an infant industry or to deal with balance of payments problems (Dam 1970, Chapter 14) . Developing countries also benefited via most-favored-nation 14 Pomfret (2007) argues that the extent of PTA formation has been exaggerated by use of faulty measures. He also notes that the most important PTAs in terms of trade volume affected, notably the European Union, coordinate policies in many areas in addition to trade, thereby achieving "deep integration" among their members. Such agreements have complex implications for the health of the multilateral trading system going far beyond the usual trade creation/trade diversion analysis. 15 Beginning in 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provided a forum where concerns of poor countries could be aired. The UNCTAD agenda included issues such as one-way trade preferences for manufactured exports of poor countries, stabilization of commodity export prices-primary commodities had accounted for about 80 percent of export earnings of these countries and a non-fuel commodity was the leading export for many-and unconditional grant aid. However, much of the agenda required the cooperation of rich countries for funding or market access. Some parts of the agenda became reality, including the Generalized System of Preferences enacted by most industrialized countries and export-earnings stabilization schemes implemented by the International Monetary Fund and the European Economic Community (EEC). Notwithstanding their special status, most of the poor countries remained poor, and those that prospered-mainly the NIEs and other East Asian countries-did so through export-oriented growth strategies. Yet these new exporters were soon subjected to discriminatory trade restrictions, and the GATT did little to shield them from policies that violated at least the spirit of its rules. Moreover, even after successive rounds of GATT-sponsored multilateral trade negotiations, labor-intensive manufactured products like shoes and especially textiles and apparel remained highly protected, while world prices of many agricultural products were depressed by generous subsidies in the United
States and European Union.
The GATT"s special treatment of developing countries turned out to be at best ineffective and perhaps even counterproductive. 17 To begin with, it was predicated on the assumption now largely discredited that trade liberalization is less desirable for developing countries than for developed countries. Facing less external pressure to open their markets to trade, the developing countries obtained less of the potential benefits to be derived from integration into world markets. Moreover, relieving the developing countries of the requirement for reciprocity meant that these countries remained on the sidelines in shaping multilateral negotiations. The developing countries thus lost the opportunity to exchange access to their own domestic markets (whether as a group or, for some larger countries, individually) for desired liberalization commitments from developed countries. By remaining nonparticipants in the successive rounds of GATT tariff reductions, they also lost the opportunity to contest disadvantageous exceptions to basic GATT rules for specific sectors, especially textiles and apparel and agriculture.
Finally, because MFN liberalization reduces the benefits enjoyed by countries with preferential access to important markets, the existence of one-way preferences may retard progress toward global free trade.
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By September 1986, when the Uruguay Round negotiations began, the total number of GATT contracting parties had grown to 91, and the majority of the additions were developing countries, including newly independent nations in Africa and elsewhere.
More developing nations joined the GATT during the negotiations that eventually produced the WTO, which commenced operation on January 1, 1995 with 128 members.
But despite ongoing efforts to provide benefits for poor countries, the operation of the GATT system was still dominated by the concerns of the developed nations, and those concerns continued to play an important role in the Uruguay Round. By 2008, an overwhelming majority of the 153 WTO members were developing countries, with 32 of the poorest classified as least developed countries (LDCs). Yet even with the rapid increase in their numbers, many observers, and especially those representing the interests of poor countries, judge that participation in the Uruguay Round and in the WTO have so far yielded few benefits for these countries.
Of the accomplishments from the Uruguay Round, the eagerly sought dismantling of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) proved to be a major disappointment to most developing countries, as China"s share of export markets for textiles and apparel Yet the ability of developing countries to engage in successful self-enforcement actions remains limited by two important factors. First, most developing countries have small markets for imports. This is partly due to small total demand but also to significant import barriers, which on average are still much higher than those of the developed countries. Since the self-enforcement process relies on the threat of WTO-authorized retaliation, its potency is limited by import market size. Thus, only larger developing countries are in a position to take advantage of the self-enforcement process. In addition, information about foreign actions that reduce market access may be difficult to obtain, especially when the actions in question are less easily observed than new trade barriers.
Developing countries have therefore focused their self-enforcement actions on types of WTO violations that are directly observable by exporting firms and governments, especially unjustified application of antidumping measures, rather than on subtler domestic measures that also limit imports. 20 Although WTO litigation costs of 20 The preponderance of cases involving antidumping may also reflect the global proliferation in this particular form of import protection.
developing countries" self-enforcement actions are already heavily subsidized by the Advisory Center on WTO Law, the significant informational costs of determining when such an action is justified remain a significant deterrent (Bown 2009 ).
Trade sanctions as a means of enforcing socioeconomic norms
The WTO is unique among international organizations in possessing an effective system by which its rules can be enforced. As a result, there has been continuing pressure going back to the GATT era to use the WTO to enforce socioeconomic norms shared by a significant number of participating countries. The justification for involving the GATT/WTO is that failure to honor social norms usually confers a cost advantage. A country"s failure to meet such norms may therefore be regarded as "social dumping" and treated in an analogous way. The main areas of domestic policy potentially affected are those concerned with environmental protection and labor standards, although as discussed in section 6.2 below, there has been recent discussion of using trade sanctions as a way to force macroeconomic "rebalancing."
Underlying the controversy regarding use of WTO-authorized trade sanctions to enforce socioeconomic norms is that national attitudes regarding environmental protection and labor standards are strongly affected by per capita income-these norms tend to be "luxury goods" whose demand rises along with citizens" incomes. Expecting poor countries to meet the same standards as rich ones may place poor countries at an important competitive disadvantage and may also be economically inefficient. For example, to the extent that labor productivity is higher in rich countries, mutually beneficial two-way trade between rich and poor countries may require similar differences in wages.
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Poor countries argue that norms should be adjusted to take into account differences in stage of development, pointing out that present labor and environmental conditions in their economies are no worse, and in some cases far better, than those that prevailed in the now-industrialized nations during an earlier era. Although actual GATT/WTO links between market access and social norms have so far been minor, 22 the issue is poised for greater significance as many developed countries begin to impose broad restrictions on carbon emissions and pressure developing countries, especially large ones like China and India, to make corresponding commitments.
Emerging issues
It is easy to point to shortcomings in the world trading system that bode ill for the future. The Doha Round had stalled repeatedly even before the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008-9. Despite a trimmed-down agenda, many observers have grown pessimistic about completion of the round. But on the positive side, even the extreme economic disruptions accompanying the global crisis did not give rise to the feared surge in protectionism and defection from WTO disciplines. Although many countries implemented some new protection, this was done almost entirely in ways that did not violate their WTO commitments, i.e., through antidumping and safeguard actions, or by 21 Consider a simple Ricardian model in which labor productivity in the richer country is four times as high in the export industry and twice as high in the import-competing industry as in the poorer country. Twoway trade is then possible only if the richer country"s wage rate is at least twice but no more than four times as high as that of the poor country, when both are measured in the same currency.
22 Their role is greater in preferential agreements. Beginning with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), many preferential agreements have explicitly linked market access to environmental and/or labor policies, though these have so far had minimal impact on policies.
raising applied tariffs that were initially lower than the corresponding bound rates (Bown and Kee, 2010) .
Meanwhile, the development of an unprecedented bilateral imbalance between the United States and China has placed an increasing strain on a system based on reciprocity, and a continuing surge of new preferential, i.e., discriminatory, trading arrangements has increased the tension between the GATT/WTO"s key MFN principle and trade realities.
MFN has now come to mean least-favored-nation treatment, i.e., paying the "list price" at the border. Beneficiaries of one-way preferences argue that fairness requires compensation for erosion of benefits when successful MFN liberalization cuts the preferential margin they now enjoy. And finally, the perceived need to reverse the growth of carbon emissions will pose an important new challenge for the WTO, as participating countries seek trade policy measures to deal with "carbon leakage" from countries not willing to join in these efforts. How are these situations likely to play out in terms of evolution of the world trading system? promoting a more open and transparent trading system. In direct contrast to proposals to further limit the scope of the negotiations as a way to facilitate agreement, Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong (2010) argue for a more ambitious package that would increase anticipated gains for major parties and thus justify the political effort required to bring the round to a successful conclusion. Whether this approach is feasible remains to be seen, but it is certainly true that progress can only be made if each participant perceives a net benefit from going forward; raising the stakes could energize the moribund process.
However, with world leaders already challenged by more urgent priorities, it is not obvious where the necessary leadership for a step in this direction can be found. However, use of trade restrictions to force an exchange-rate appreciation would represent a major shift in the mission of the GATT/WTO, which normally focuses on measures that affect the composition of trade flows rather than aggregate imbalances (Bown and McCulloch, 2009) . Moving in this direction would open the door to further actions whenever a country"s exports seemed "too large" or imports "too small"-according to criteria still to be determined.
Some argue that by maintaining a low international price for the yuan, China is in effect subsidizing its exports, and that a countervailing duty equal to the extent of yuan undervaluation would be appropriate under WTO rules. However, there is no consensus among economic experts on the extent of yuan undervaluation. Moreover, an analysis by
Staiger and Sykes (forthcoming) raises analytical doubts concerning this approach. While excluded countries as a group may be harmed, this effect is usually sufficiently dispersed to avoid any major fallout. Yet even the most ardent supporters of the preferential approach see it as a complement to multilateral liberalization rather than a substitute. The real challenge is to avoid creating a thicket of inconsistent policies that further complicate the task of achieving liberalization multilaterally (Baldwin 2006 ).
Plummer (2007) advocates a multi-layered liberalization process in which regional agreements are based on "best practices" (the lasagna bowl). These might include a requirement that PTAs accept new members, perhaps after an initial waiting period. Kawai, Petri, and Sisli Ciammara (2009) and Lawrence (2008) envision the evolution of the WTO into a host organization for regional "clubs" formed by subsets of its members.
In contrast to the current laissez-faire approach toward PTAs, the WTO could develop and enforce guidelines for club actions and also serve as a neutral arbiter of disputes arising among club members.
The tension between preferential trading and multilateral liberalization is greatest in the case of poor countries that are the beneficiaries of one-way preferences. While it may be laudable to bend WTO rules in a way that ensures gains for even the poorest participants, there may be other ways to achieve this goal without creating built-in opposition to multilateral liberalization (which reduces the value of trade preferences).
One approach that has received increasing attention in recent years is aid for tradeprovision of resources that help poor countries achieve gains from trade, through measures ranging from expert assistance in identifying areas of comparative advantage to improvements in port facilities and customs procedures. Measures of this kind facilitate mutually beneficial trade by accelerating the integration of poor countries into world markets, rather than creating an artificial advantage for a particular group of exporters.
Another approach is to maintain the model of a single undertaking, but, as in the Uruguay Round, allow developing countries a longer period in which to achieve compliance. A third option is to focus MFN tariff-cutting efforts on the goods of greatest interest to developing country exporters.
Trade and climate change.
Reconciling WTO rules with national policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions is sure to pose a major challenge for the world trading system. would create a "green policy space" within which WTO members could take appropriate measures to limit emissions. In principle, the green space would allow countries some leeway within WTO rules to maintain the competitiveness of their own industries while raising environmental standards. At the same time, the Code would prevent the misuse of environmental policies to discriminate against goods and services produced abroad or to favor imports from preferred source countries.
A related and more immediate issue concerns trade policies toward green goods and services-the inputs used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Negotiations on trade in green goods and services are on the Doha Round agenda, and Pascal Lamy, DirectorGeneral of the WTO, argues that WTO members have a strong interest in opening their markets to such goods as a way to improve the efficiency of their economies. 24 But
Lamy"s argument applies equally to liberalizing imports of almost any type of industrial input, and it thus ignores the need to overcome opposition from competing domestic producers. In practice, such a negotiation is likely to be complex and protracted, beginning with the determination of exactly which goods and services should be included.
Compared to other environment-related policies that have generated past WTO disputes (e.g., protection of dolphins and turtles), both costs and benefits associated with efforts to limit climate change are likely to be very large, and their effects experienced over many economic sectors. For these reasons, such a negotiation is urgent. However, finding the necessary common ground for agreement in a large and diverse group of nations is sure to be difficult-perhaps the largest challenge yet for the international trading system.
Looking ahead
This chapter has reviewed the evolution and structure of the GATT/WTO system as well as several emerging issues likely to affect its performance in achieving its various goals. However, the current state of the international trading system provides good reasons for optimism. Most important, the system has survived more or less unscathed the worst global economic conditions since the Great Depression and the inevitable resurgence of protectionist sentiment worldwide. WTO disciplines, backed by the dispute settlement mechanism, remain a potent safeguard against unchecked unilateral measures to limit foreign competition. Despite some increase in (GATT-legal) temporary protection, trade flows have rebounded vigorously as world economic growth has revived. But as discussed in the previous section, the system has yet to deal with some pressing issues. Thus, the status quo, while representing an important achievement in terms of multilateral cooperation, will not be enough to maintain the open and predictable market access that WTO members have come to expect.
Can the necessary progress be made? In the past, U.S. hegemony played a key role in shaping international institutions, but the United States does not appear ready to assume anything beyond shared responsibility for the provision of global public goods.
New problems have also been raised by the emergence of large and economically powerful developing countries, such as China, India, and Brazil. Still poor relative to the United States and other industrialized countries, these countries are reluctant to participate in international agreements on the same terms as their much richer
counterparts, yet their impact on the global economy and on global emissions is too large to be exempted without undermining the overall effectiveness of the system. The solution may lie in a two-part strategy that builds on the success of the WTO via completion of the Doha Round while also dealing flexibly with some complex issues by building from the bottom up, i.e., by channeling PTA formation and expansion along lines that provide a clearer path toward multilateral liberalization.
